Transcribed from South Africa Magazine, 12 September 1896
By Ellen Stanton
LOSS OF THE “DRUMMOND CASTLE.”
OFFICIAL REPORT
The report of the official inquiry into the loss of the Drummond Castle, off Ushant, in June last, has just been issued as a Parliamentary paper, signed by Mr. R. H. B. Marsham, Captain J. S. Castle, Captain Richard C. Dyer, R.N., and Captain W. B. Bigley. After giving a detailed description of the ill-fated liner, which was classed 100 A1 at Lloyds, and insured for £45,000, the report sets forth, as follows, the special instructions which were given to Captain Pierce by the owners:--
“Instruction 1.—Before proceeding on the voyage you will satisfy yourself that your compasses are properly adjusted and cards of deviation supplied. Also that the errors and rates of the chronometers (three in number) are furnished, and all necessary and latest Admiralty Charts are on board.”
“Instruction 3.—See that the boats are kept ready for use, thoroughly equipped with provisions, water, &c., in case of collision or loss, and exercise the men when opportunity offers in lowering the boats at sea, so that stewards and others may become accustomed to the handling of the tackle, and that you may lose no time in the event of anyone falling overboard.”
“Instruction 15.—Be extremely careful to keep a good look-out at all times. In running up and down the English Channel, and in all crowded waters, in running along coasts, and in making or leaving the land, you must always have two officers on watch at the same time, namely, a senior and a junior officer, who are to see that look-outs are regularly placed, both on the forecastle and on the upper bridge, and you are to have extra look-outs as the occasion may require. The look-out on the forecastle stationed is to respond ‘all’s well’ as every bell is struck.”
“Instruction 16.—Use the lead when in the least doubt, and never neglect to use it when approaching or leaving land (as depth of water and quality of bottom will in most cases show your position), particularly during the night, or when you are unable to verify your position by cross-bearings of well-known and well-defined points.”
“Instruction 17.—In order to ascertain the ship’s position with accuracy and precision, you and the chief officer will take morning and afternoon sights separately, and these sights are to be worked out by all the officers and handed in to you. The chief officer will work out his own observations by a chronometer specially supplied to him, and lay the ship’s position down in his own chart, and will inform you of the position according to his own observations, and of the bearing and distance of the point for which the ship is steering. Observations for determining the deviation of the compass are to be made as frequently as possible by all the deck officers, and noted in the log. The latitude by noon observations, or by single or double altitude, must be observed by at least three officers every day.”
“Instruction 20.—You are strongly recommended to exercise great caution in making the coast of Portugal, especially during foggy weather. We need not remind you of the numerous wrecks that have taken place on the coasts of Spain and Portugal.”
“Instruction 23.—You are earnestly warned not to keep too near the shore, whether navigating along a European or a foreign coast.”
“Instruction 26.—Any infringement or neglect of the foregoing particular orders respecting navigation will involve serious consequences to the offending commander.”
“Instruction 31.—Keep a firm hand over the whole of your officers, engineers, and crew, and give personal attention to the proper carrying out of what you know to be their duties.”
“Instruction 44.—Before starting on a voyage give each man his station at the boats, and in port exercise them by sudden calls during day or night in lowering at the alarm of fire.”
The Inspectors, having drawn attention to the most important clauses of the Sailing Directions for approaching Ushant, earnestly recommend that in doubtful weather a full allowance should be made for the well-known easterly set, and a wide berth given it. Strict attention should be paid to the use of the lead, which should be kept constantly going in thick weather. In their opinion, when delicate instruments were used for sounding by officers and men, there ought to be practice in the use of them.
The report concludes as follows:--“We have not sufficient
evidence as to the state of the weather experienced by the Drummond Castle on
the 16th, and we cannot express an opinion as to whether it was such
as to enable the master to determine his position by observation. But we have
the evidence of the chief officer of the Accra that observations were taken on
board her. We have also extracts from the log of the Peninsular and Oriental
Company’s ship Chusan, which vessel was nearly in the same locality; as they
had observations we may fairly assume that those on board the Drummond Castle
could have taken them also. Two unsuccessful attempts were made to obtain
soundings, one at 7:30 p.m., the other at 7:40 p.m., the ship at that time
going 12 knots or thereabouts; 200 fathoms of wire ran out, and it was then
found that the machine recorded 41 and 42 fathoms respectively, with no bottom.
These two soundings were clearly inaccurate. At or about 7:50 p.m. the vessel
was stopped, and a correct sounding taken in 75 fathoms. We are satisfied that
soundings were not taken after the last-mentioned hour. If the lead had been
kept constantly going and correct soundings obtained, the vessel could never
have arrived in the position where she has been found—due south of Stiff Point
Lighthouse 3 ½ miles, in 31 fathoms of water, lying north-east and
south-west—and ample warning would have been given that the vessel was
approaching danger. The Sailing Directions clearly lay down that the lead, and
the lead alone, is the sole guide when approaching Ushant in thick weather. The
only reason that we can give for the neglect of the lead is, that the depth of
water found at or about 8 p.m. corresponding with the vessel’s assumed position
on the chart, the master went on fully confident that the position he thought
he was in was correct. There was a thick fog in the vicinity of Ushant before
and after 9 p.m. of June 16, and the fog signal was duly sounded. It was not
heard by any of the survivors of the Drummond Castle, but she was probably out
of range of the sound. There were two officers on the bridge, the watch of
officers having been doubled, but there was only one man on the forecastle. We
are of opinion that the look-outs from the forecastle should also have been
doubled. She was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care, inasmuch as the
use of the lead was neglected, and she was going at too great a rate of speed
in thick weather in a very dangerous locality. The casualty was primarily caused
by sufficient allowance not having been made for the easterly current, the
effect of which would doubtless have been averted if the master had made
frequent use of the lead. The master no doubt thought, when he saw the Werfa,
that he had passed Ushant, and then steered a Channel course. Had he used the
lead before altering the course he would have known at once that he was inside
of the 65-fathom line, and not in the position in which he supposed himself to
be, and then instead of steering a Channel course, he would have gone nearly in
the opposite direction for some time. The circumstances under which so many
lives were lost must have been from the rapid manner in which the vessel sank.
The different witnesses have stated that she went down in about seven minutes.
We think that she probably foundered in less time than that mentioned. The
cause for her foundering so rapidly was her striking the rock with her
starboard bilge, and from her great weight and speed she no doubt ripped her
side open as far aft as the stoke-hold, filling immediately. We regret that the
lifeboats were not swung out on the homeward voyage after leaving Las Palmas,
but the two quarter-boats were swung out, and one of them was only partly
lowered when the ship went down, and our impression is that if the lifeboats
had been swung out they could not have lowered in time to save lives. It has
been suggested that those on board the Werfa, knowing their own position, might
have warned the Drummond Castle that she was standing into danger; but there
being no established night signal for such a purpose they were unable to do so,
though possibly they might have attracted the attention of those on board of
her if they had continuously blown their whistle. We wish to strongly recommend
that some night signal should be established to warn vessels of their vicinity
to danger; being of opinion that this overwhelming calamity might very possibly
have been averted if the Werfa could have signaled to the Drummond Castle. We,
in conclusion, wish to express our deepest sympathy with the relatives and
friends of those who have met their deaths in this most distressing disaster.
And we also desire to thank the French Government for the very prompt and
valuable assistance they have rendered during the whole of this painful
investigation and in the course of this inquiry. And we are also anxious to
convey our deep sense of gratitude to the French clergy and fishermen who have
so kindly and sympathetically treated the few survivors from the vessel, and
aided the relations and friends of those drowned in the discovery and
identification of the bodies and their interment.”
Miscellaneous articles on the same page:
MISSING RELATIVES
[Under this heading we give from week to week particulars of cases where long-lost relatives are being sought for by their friends or connections in this country. Information relating thereto, if sent to the Editor of “South Africa,” 39, Old Broad Street, London, E.C., will, so far as is possible, be communicated to the parties concerned.]
REGINA MCKENZIE sailed from Egypt for Cape Town in July, 1888, with the 3rd Rifle Brigade. When last heard from in 1890 she was living at 8, Vernon Terrace, off Caledonian Street, Cape Town. Brother Hugh wishes for news.
WILLIAM RANKEILLER, who left Edinburgh ten years ago, was last heard of in Albany, New South Wales, but is believed to be now in Cape Colony. His mother, Mrs. Rankeiller, inquires.
H. C. BAKER was last heard of in 1893 at Salisbury, Rhodesia. His sister, Mrs. Stone, 16, Kingston Road, Bordesley, Birmingham, inquires.
THOMAS BINNEY WOODROW, formerly of Launceston, Cornwall, was last heard from at Kimberley, over twelve years ago. Supposed to have gone from Kimberley to Johannesburg or Pretoria. W. B. Woodrow inquires.
THOMAS BARRATT, bricklayer, who left Erith, Kent, about thirty-five years ago, and went with a Captain Mason to South Africa, was last heard of in Orange Free State. His sister, now Mrs. Sarah Chapman, inquires.
HENRY BATTCHER, gasfitter, of Johannesburg, who in 1879 lived at No. 36, York Street, Walworth Road, London, is sought by his son Henry, who also asks for his brothers—William, Charles, George, or Arthur.
FRY AND DAVIDSON, shipping agents for the John Line, sailed from London for Port Natal December, 1850, with a party of emigrants who were entitled to grants of land on the estate of Mr. Morewood, Compensation, Victoria County, Natal. W. Irons, Waterloo, Liverpool, inquires.
GEORGE FORDHAM, shipwright, last wrote home 24 years ago from Bloemfontein, Orange Free State, South Africa, but was then going to move nearer the Transvaal. Sister Emma anxiously awaits news.
JOHN HARRISON, bricklayer, of Manchester, sailed for Johannesburg, South Africa, on February 27, 1890. He stayed there 10 months, and then went to work at the Victoria Hotel, Vryburg, but left on March 20, 1892, to return to Johannesburg. Sister Kate anxiously awaits tidings.
At Port Elizabeth, the family of the late Mr. William Savage have offered to erect a building, to cost £5000, for the purpose of a library in memory of their deceased father, provided that a suitable site can be found. The generous offer is much appreciated locally, and it is hoped that the Library Committee may see their way to the establishment of a free library.
Small-pox seems to be by no means on the decline at Johannesburg. Official returns to hand show that there were two white and ten coloured cases at the Lazaretto at Rietfontein; while twelve white and six coloured persons were in quarantine as suspects, thus making in all thirty patients. Later news was to the effect that another had been discovered at Fordsburg; while fifteen more suspects had been removed, as they showed strong symptoms. Advices from Maritzburg stated that small-pox was increasing in an alarming manner amongst the natives in the district of Richmond.